In what respects, if any, should the
primates be equal?
Elizabeth Murphy

H

uman beings are undoubtedly blessed with the most
extraordinary gift of nature—the most sophisticated
consciousness. However, it is also this superb awareness
which shackles some Homo sapiens with an abject
humiliation - an irrational horror of their animality. The human
animals’ realisation of their biological, hence finite, condition can
impel them to fearfully disclaim their ancestry and strive to
'transcend' their natural condition. The human species' claim to
superior physical and moral status in the natural world on the basis
of either their 'unique' rationality, dignity or worth, is specious.
Traditional western philosophical, religious, scientific and literary
ideologies have initiated and sustained a myth that the other
animals, including the Great Apes other than Homo sapiens, are
inferior members of the natural world. These ideologies have
contributed to our primate cousins’ exclusion from the opportunity
to relish a life suffused with physical, intellectual and emotional
dignity.
In this article I intend to briefly appraise some of the areas within
western traditional ideologies which have perpetuated the attitude
that all animals, other than human, are not entitled to be treated with
even the minimal degree of respect accorded to some human beings.
I also intend to evaluate contemporary sources which indicate that in
view of recent field studies and scientific research on the non-human
primates, existing objections to the extension of equality (implying
moral obligations) to the other primates 1 can no longer be sustained.
Recorded attempts of the search by western scholars for an
explanation of the origins of the species, particularly the existence
1 References in this article to 'the other primates', 'non-human primates', 'other
Great Apes' refer to those primates other than human presently taxonomically
categorised within the order Hominoidea as chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans.
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and nature of the human species, reveal that theories have been
swayed either by disarming ignorance or misplaced conceit. From
audacious beginnings as humble ‘prickly barks’ 2 (c.500BC), the
human animal has become elevated in status to the extent that
humans generally consider themselves to be the sublime result of the
biological evolutionary process. The notion of the human animal's
supremacy over inanimate and all other animate living forms gained
credence, in part, because of the acceptance of the influential works
of the Greek philosopher, Aristotle (384-322BC). 3
Following his categorisations differentiating plants, animals and
humans, Aristotle concluded that what clearly differentiates humans
from the other animals is that the human alone, of all animate things,
has the capacity to reason. Whilst other animal beings and plants
have the ability to perceive or respond to environmental factors,
they do not have consciousness, that is, they lack self-awareness and
the ability to reason abstractly. Rather than use reason, plants
respond to stimuli, and animals 'obey their instincts'. 4
Furthermore, Aristotle's claim of the existence of a 'principle of rule
and subordination in nature at large' also contributed to sanctioning
the idea that animals exist without any intrinsic worth. 5
Plants exist to give subsistence to animals, and
animals to give it to (men). Animals...serve to
furnish man not only with food, but also with
other comforts...Accordingly, as nature makes
nothing purposeless or in vain, all animals must
have been made by nature for the sake of men. 6

Anaximander, quoted by Plutarch, in Early Greek Philosophy, J. Barnes, (Penguin,
London, 1987), p. 73.
3 Aristotle, 'Parts of Animals' in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes, Book
1, Chapter 1, 645b, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991), p. 998.
4 Aristotle, Politics, trans E. Barber, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977), I.V., 9,
p. 6.
5 ibid., V, 1, p. 91.
6 In this article, the generic 'men' or 'man' is retained solely for the purpose of
quoting ad verbatim. See Aristotle, Politics, V111, p. 95.
2
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As animals exist within nature without the capacity to reason (being
guided instead by instincts) they are, therefore, provided by nature
for the use of the human being.
Apart from the influence of ancient Greek writers such as Aristotle,
the writings of the ancient Hebrews and later of Christian
theologians were also instrumental in the formation of a demeaning
attitude towards the other animals within western culture. In the
ancient Hebrew text The First Book of Moses, called Genesis 7, two
aspects in particular warrant attention. The account of the origin of
the human within the world: 'So God created man in his own image,
in the image of God created he him; male and female created he
them.' 8 reflects an existing cultural belief in the pre-eminence of the
human species, especially the male of the species. Furthermore,
instructions to humans to 'have dominion over the fish of the sea,
and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth
upon the earth' 9 authorises humans to adopt authority over all the
animals.
Later Christian doctrines also reflect the disparate relationship
between humans and the animals. In his work Summa Theologica, St.
Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-1274) advises 'There is no sin in using a
thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such
that the imperfect are for the perfect...things, like plants which
merely have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for
man.' 10 In addition, Aquinas' ruling 'it matters not how man behaves
to animals, because God has subjected all things to man's power' 11
would have undoubtedly contributed to reinforcing cultural beliefs
of the mental and moral supremacy of the human and exacerbated
existing exploitative practices against the animals. As a result of
these doctrines, the other Great Apes, in particular, have been
especially maligned within western cultural discourse and
symbolism.

Genesis, The Holy Bible, (King James version, 1611), pp. 5-64.
ibid., 1:27, p. 6.
9 ibid., 1:28, p. 6.
10 Aquinas, from ‘Summa Theologica’, quoted in Animal Liberation, P. Singer,
(Jonathan Cape, London, 1976), p. 211.
11 ibid., p. 213.
7
8
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Of all the animals, the non-human primate has been most 'deeply
involved in western ideas on human nature, morals and origins' 12
and consequently occupies a prominent, yet paradoxical, position
within western cultural symbolism. In traditional eastern cultures
monkeys and apes were accorded respect as they were considered to
be mediators between the human and a deity, or alternatively were
personified and revered as a deity. 13 In comparison, apart from a
period in the eighteenth century when apes were pictured as gentle,
'human-like creatures', western culture has tended to stereotype the
primates as savage, brutal beings; beings personifying licentious or
evil behaviours—behaviours deemed as uncivilised or immoral
within human societies. Furthermore, the primates were generally
the objects of derision, being perceived as either intriguing
zoological exhibits or as creatures deserving extermination. 14
The non-human primates have long endured being the 'object' of
human fascination. Fascination itself, if applied with consideration
and courtesy towards the being who is viewed, is not necessarily a
problem. However, the present ambiguous biological 15 and moral
standing of the other primates within western communities is not a
reflection of our society's 'fascination with the primates', but rather
an attitude which reflects the fact that our fascination has mostly
been perverse. Unlike the other animals, however, the non-human
primates do occupy a unique position in the psyche of humans and
in the natural world. To the consternation of some humans, the nonhuman primates alone of all animals other than human, most
resemble in form and behaviour the human animal. 'They are neither
completely human, nor completely animal, but both at once'. None
but the other primates 'inhabit the margins of humanity' 16, a

R. Corbey, ‘Ambiguous Apes’, in The Great Ape Project, eds., P. Cavalieri & P.
Singer, (Fourth Estate, London, 1993), p. 129.
13 ibid., pp. 129-130.
14 ibid., p. 131.
15 I am of the opinion that the present taxonomical categorisation of the
chimpanzee primate and the human primate does not honestly reflect the human's
kin relationship to them. In evolutionary terms, the chimpanzee and the human
share a 'recent' common ancestor, are genetically dissimilar by less than 1% and yet
are classified within separate families, namely Pongidae and Hominidae
respectively.
16 Corbey, ‘Ambiguous Apes’, p. 130.
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collective of privileged primates reluctant to accept, let alone
approve, a change in status for our cousins from 'object' to subject.
The realisation within recent times of the Great Ape's capacity to be
self-aware, to reason and to feel has gradually altered, to a degree,
cultural perception of them and given rise to the dilemma regarding
their disenfranchisement from the moral domain. The rigid
distinction traditionally assumed to exist between the human and
other animals has proved difficult to maintain, especially in light of
indisputable evidence of the primate origins of humankind. 17 In
addition, a more sophisticated understanding gained through the
scientific disciplines including genetics and molecular biology has
led to a reappraisal of the existing taxonomic systems, particularly
with regard to the human/animal distinction. Furthermore, recent
field studies and scientific research have contributed to scientific and
ethical challenges to existing theories and beliefs in relation to our
kinship with, and our unethical treatment of, the other Great Apes.
Results from studies conducted to assess the cognitive abilities of the
primates have issued a challenge to the most cherished 'hallmark' of
the human—the ability to reason. The ability to reason arises from
the faculty of consciousness, the origin of the experiences referred to
as thought, self-awareness, emotions, intentionality etc. The human's
claim to be entitled to occupy a privileged and dominant position
within the natural world, including the animal kingdom, is based
upon the belief that the human animal alone has the 'unique' ability
to reason. This claim, however, is contested by researchers Roger
Fouts and Deborah Fouts 18 following their studies with chimpanzee
primates. The researchers claim that demonstrations of an array of a
complex set of abilities, and spontaneous communication amongst
themselves and with human researchers, verifies the undeniable
existence, within the chimpanzee primates, of non-human thought.

Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, (Faber & Faber, London, (1889), 1979).
Whilst Darwin did not emphatically state that the human being was indeed an ape
(p. 217) his explication of the origins of vegetative and animal species (being both a
biological and an evolutionary process) resulted in altered cultural perceptions
and eventual scientific acceptance of the primate origins of humankind.
18 R.S. Fouts and D.H. Fouts, 'Chimpanzees' Use of Sign Language', in Cavalieri &
Singer, The Great Ape Project, pp. 28-41.
17
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In one particular investigation 19 of the cognitive abilities of
chimpanzees, Fouts and Fouts conducted a remote videotaped study
of chimpanzees using American sign language in over five thousand
instances. According to Fouts and Fouts, demonstrations of certain
behaviours previously considered unique to the human and
associated with the human's reasoning process were demonstrated
to be present within the chimpanzees. For example, like humans,
chimpanzees are able to use what is referred to as 'referential
communication', that is, the chimpanzees have the ability to think
about, and comment on things and events in their environment. In
addition, the employment of 'informative signing' indicates that the
chimpanzees are able to ask for things not in their immediate
environment. 20 The ability to refer to things and events not in an
immediate environment was previously thought to be an ability that
only humans are capable of possessing. Also, the use by the
chimpanzee subjects of 'expressive signing' to spontaneously express
an emotion when upset or excited by something 21 is an indication
that chimpanzees, as well as humans, subjectively experience
emotions. Furthermore, according to Fouts and Fouts, chimpanzees
not only displayed evidence of imagination and memory but are
able, following the acquisition of human sign language, to pass the
language on to following generations. 22
It is apparent from results of this particular study by Fouts and Fouts
that chimpanzee beings are able not only to communicate within
their own kind, but possess the capacity to reason to the extent that
they have the ability to 'adopt' a human language to reciprocate the
human's attempt to communicate with them. The study further
indicates that chimpanzee beings are capable of acting with a sense
of purpose, that is, intentionally, and that they too experience
emotions. The study therefore negates the human being's claim to
what was previously considered an ability unique to the human—
reason. It also provides an opportunity to challenge another human
presumption: on the basis that humans are biologically unique
because of their capacity to reason and are therefore intrinsically
ibid., pp. 33-39.
Fouts and Fouts, ‘Chimpanzees’ Use of Sign Language’, p. 35.
21 ibid., pp. 35-36.
22 ibid., pp. 36-39.
19
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valuable, the human alone of all creatures is the sole creature eligible
and entitled to claim the right to a life infused with physical,
intellectual and emotional dignity.
If acceptance into the community of equals is on the proviso that one
be a conscious being, that is a being able to reason, having the
capacity to feel emotions, feel pain and suffering, and be self-aware,
then the evidence from the above study alone indicates that calls to
include the other Great Apes within the human moral domain are
not based upon theoretical delusion or misplaced sentimentality, but
upon empirically verifiable facts.
According to the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 23 the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world depends upon
recognition of not only the inherent dignity of the human being but
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family. 24 The fundamental rights accorded to humans: 'Everyone has
the right to life, liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment'
(Articles 3 and 5) 25, were intended as a common standard by which
nations could promote respect for the intrinsic value of all members
of their communities and the human species universally. These
particular rights are vital to human beings, particularly if they are
living within societies reluctant to recognise the intrinsic worth of an
individual. Without them their hopes of living a life with some sense
of security and general well-being are diminished.
Needless to say, if the human scientific establishment eventually
managed to recognise the human being’s kinship with the other
Great Apes, the human moral community also needs to do some
research. The universal human moral community is in a position to
use its moral agency to recognise that a number of 'our family' are
being denied the opportunity to exercise their inalienable rights to
life, liberty and freedom from torture.

23 The General Assembly, United Nations, 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights'
(1948), in Human Rights, C. Freeman, (B.T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1990), pp. 66-68.
24 ibid., p. 66.
25 ibid., p. 11.
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In 'A Declaration on the Great Apes' 26, a group of persons concerned
with the current status and plight of the other Great Apes is
lobbying for the 'extension of the community of equals to include all
great apes: human beings, chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans'. 27
The 'community of equals' is defined as the moral community within
which its members accept certain basic moral principles or rights as
governing their relations with each other and which are enforceable
at law. 28 Amongst these principles or rights are included:
• The Right to Life
The lives of members of the community of
equals are to be protected. Members of the
community of equals may not be killed
except in very strictly defined circumstances,
for example, self-defence.
• The Protection of Individual Liberty
Members of the community of equals are not
to be arbitrarily deprived of their liberty.
• The Prohibition of Torture
The deliberate infliction of severe pain on a
member of the community of equals, either
wantonly or for an alleged benefit to others,
is
regarded as torture, and is wrong. 29
As mentioned previously, of all the Great Apes, only the human ape
is protected by legislation against denial of the above three basic
rights. The human ape also has recourse to anti-discrimination laws,
unlike our cousins, who are dependent upon others to combat the
crime of 'speciesism'.

ibid., p. 11.
ibid., p. 4.
28 ibid., p. 4.
29 ibid.
26
27
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Speciesism, as defined by Singer, is 'a prejudice or attitude of bias in
favour of the interests of members of one's own species and against
those of members of other species'. 30 Given that there are differences
between humans and non-human primates, and that the capacity to
reason within the other primates is not as 'sophisticated' as the
humans' ability to reason, it needs to be recognised that there are
also members of the human community with varying degrees of
mental capacity. 31
Human individuals such as infants, comatose and brain-damaged
persons and those afflicted with mental illness are protected by
statutory rights from being excluded from the human moral
community regardless of their mental capacities and/or ability to
exercise their autonomy. 'If possessing a higher degree of
intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his(sic)
own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the
same purpose?'. 32 It stands to reason that on the basis that the other
Great Apes possess consciousness, self-awareness, and have the
capacity to reason and experience emotions, they are just as entitled
to be included within the community of equals as are the able and
less abled members of our species.
It is beyond dispute that the primates, including the human, share a
specific morphological feature - the central nervous system - a
product of which is the physical experience of pain. Considering that
it has been scientifically proven that the other primates also have
self-awareness, one could safely infer that they, along with the
human primate, share not only the feeling of pain but also the
experience of misery arising as a result of it. Apart from
physiological evidence, common sense should enable the human
species to acknowledge that suffering as a result of experiencing
pain is an experience common to both us and the other primates.
This knowledge does not generally appear, however, to impel

P. Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals, (Jonathan
Cape, London, 1976), p. 7.
31 Heta Hayry and Matti Hayry, 'Who's Like Us?', in Cavalieri & Singer, The Great
Ape Project, p. 176.
32 Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 7.
30
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human beings to exercise their moral agency in a manner humane to
our kin.
A human being in possession of his/her faculty of consciousness is
aware that there is a limit to the endurance of pain. Upon reaching a
point at which endurance is insufferable, at least the human can
physically and verbally articulate his/her anguish. Recognition of the
commonality of the experience of misery resulting from suffering
pain does not appear to be a primary concern in the attitude of some
humans conducting experiments upon other sentient animals,
including the other primates. As Singer has succinctly noted ‘[w]hile
we overlook our savagery, we exaggerate that of other animals’. 33
The human species, let alone a human community of equals, is
somewhat of a misnomer. In spite of nations uniting and declaring a
charter of universal human rights, historically, some western
individuals and their societies have not always managed to behave
in an egalitarian manner. The subjugation of women and
enslavement or genocide of indigenous peoples, for instance, are
prime examples of some peoples' attitudes to certain members of the
species. Human resistance to change is understandable to the degree
that those occupying positions of power and dominance are
reluctant to alter the 'status quo' and forgo their privileges. Some
humans’ propensity to assume a recalcitrant attitude is, I believe,
rather accurately reflected in the following quote:
Man usually either considers himself a selfmade animal and consequently adores his
maker, or assumes himself to be the creation of
a supreme intelligence, for which the latter is
alternately congratulated and blamed. An
attitude of humility, abasement, contrition, and
apology for its shortcomings is thoroughly
uncharacteristic of the species Homo sapiens,
except as a manifestation of religion. I am
convinced that this most salutary of religious
attitudes should be carried over into science.

33

Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 248.
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Man should confess his evolutionary
deficiencies, and resolve that, in future, he will
try to be a better animal. 34
Given that our understanding of biological beings has advanced,
especially since the advent of molecular biology, and given the
scientific evidence of the existence of reason and self-awareness in
the non-human primates, contemporary society is now in a position
to seriously consider evidence repudiating former views which were
detrimental to the well being of the primates. As Hooton states, the
human animal could indeed be a better animal. Rather than
presuming that Homo sapiens is positioned at the pinnacle of the
evolutionary process, the human species could extend consideration
to all the other animals. The other animals could be viewed as
successful adaptors of their specific species, animals who too can
reason and feel. At the very least, the other Great Apes could be
extended the courtesy of being treated as the subjects they are and
receive their due entitlements of 'the right to life, the protection of
individual liberty and freedom from torture'. 35
As the present situation stands, intervention in the non-human
primates' lives in human controlled situations is not without
attendant complications. It is obvious upon reading the concerned,
even passionate, accounts 36 of their encounters with the other Great
Apes, that some researchers, observers and carers hold these special
Beings in the highest esteem. However, by imparting specifically
human cultural behaviours and concepts to the other primates there
is, I believe, the possibility of some members of the human species
attempting to impose our culture upon them.
Our level of awareness, apart from bringing us our most exquisite
joys, also brings us our greatest angst and, at times, awesome
sorrow.

E.A. Hooton, from ‘Apes, Men and Morons’ (1937), quoted in The Evolution of
Evil, T. Anders, (Open Court, Illinois, 1994),p. 73.
35 The Editors and Contributors, ‘A Declaration on Great Apes’, Cavalieri & Singer,
The Great Ape Project, p.4.
36 ibid., pp. 1-312.
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What does it mean to be a self-conscious animal?
The idea is ludicrous, if it is not monstrous. It
means to know that one is food for worms. This
is the terror: to have emerged from nothing, to
have a name, consciousness of self, deep inner
feelings, an excruciating inner yearning for life
and self-expression—and with all this yet to
die. 37
Imposition of the 'condition' known as human upon the other Great
Apes would be highly questionable, if not inhumane. Far better they,
our cousins relish their freedom under their canopies and skies
we be relieved of reading their suffering with
mad, bleeding eyes.
E.M.
Bernard Rollin's inspirational appeal for the extension of the right to
life, liberty and freedom from torture to the non-human primates:
We should let them be...(with) their
inexhaustible wonders and grandeur, And let
the dictum be proclaimed—know without
hunting, see without manipulating, cherish in
itself, not for myself 38
captures a notion of equality already implicit in feminist ethics. It is
one, I believe, which could foster not only acceptance of, but a
universal respect for, all living beings regardless of sex, gender, race
or species.
One would hope with the approaching millennium and the
corresponding two thousandth anniversary of the western ethical
system - which claims mercy to be one of its principal tenets - the
human species would unfetter, from the criminal arena of
speciesism, our primate cousins.
E. Becker, quoted in T. Anders, The Evolution of Evil, p. 179.
B.E. Rollin, 'The Ascent of Apes - Broadening the Moral Community', in
Cavalieri & Singer, The Great Ape Project, p. 216.
37
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For my cousins -

(especially 'the Girls')
My cousins are wailing, waiting
The earth is listening, weeping
I am hearing, hurting
Learning, believing
Planning.
E.M.
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